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9.1  Introduction 
The employment relation is perhaps the most important contractual relation- 
ship in the economy. The way in which this relationship translates worker pref- 
erences and capabilities into production affects the daily lives of  all parties 
concerned. The organization of work and pay  affects such diverse aspects of 
our lives as our education decisions, our social lives, and our effort choices. 
The objective of this paper is to offer some insight into the employment rela- 
tionship by  reviewing the available empirical work on how firms compensate 
their workers. 
Following a long tradition from Mincer and Becker, labor economists have 
typically studied compensation by  estimating earnings equations using indi- 
vidual data across a wide range of  firms. The standard wage equation then 
identifies the reduced form mapping from worker characteristics to pay. This 
work has been particularly successful in understanding the effect of education, 
labor market experience, or training on earnings. This approach is generally 
associated with the human capital model of the labor market, where the regres- 
sion coefficients on education, experience, and tenure typically reflect the mar- 
ket price of those attributes. Therefore, wages reflect contemporaneous mar- 
ginal product.  ' 
Canice Prendergast is professor of business economics at the University of Chicago Graduate 
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1. Earnings equations typically include coefficients on demographic variables, which are more 
difficult to interpret. In particular, coefficients on gender and race variables may reflect preferences 
for discrimination rather than the marginal product of those groups. However, it is still fair to say 
that the standard approach to understanding earnings in the economy is firmly grounded in human 
capital theory. 
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The purpose of this paper is to show that factors beyond contemporaneous 
human capital also affect wage determination.  Deviations from the human cap- 
ital model will be described using two themes of the recent theoretical litera- 
ture on compensation, namely, incentive theory and learning or matching the- 
ory. I begin by considering the effect of incentives on wages. There is a large 
theoretical literature on agency contracts, and there is empirical evidence on a 
wide array of workers showing how such agency considerations affect com- 
pensation. The literature has taken two conceptual approaches. Some work 
directly considers whether incentives matter by estimating the effect of incen- 
tive provisions on some measure of performance. A more indirect approach 
has been to test the importance of agency theory by checking whether observed 
contracts contain the incentive features predicted by the theory. 
The second area of research surveyed examines how learning about the tal- 
ents of workers affects the dynamics of wages. The purpose of  this line of 
research is to better understand how careers develop within firms. For instance, 
are more able workers assigned to more suitable  jobs and offered more training 
than their less able counterparts? If  so, a considerable part of  the returns to 
experience and tenure may be attributable  to the assignment  of workers to jobs, 
offering a social return to the information that firms collect on their workers. 
Related to this, another theme of the literature on careers has been the role of 
jobs in the careers of workers. For instance, how important is it that workers 
change position for advancement? 
Section 9.3 provides a critical overview of how much has been learned from 
the existing studies. Tho themes emerge. First, I argue that an empirical identi- 
fication problem and a theoretical identification problem hamper our under- 
standing of  incentive compensation. The empirical identification problem 
arises from the fact that different contracts are not randomly assigned to differ- 
ent workers. For example, suppose that one contract is offered to better work- 
ers.* In this case, simply comparing productivity under different contracts 
could reflect these omitted variables rather than the effect of  the contracts 
themselves. This is the standard empirical identification problem well known 
in the literature. However, section 9.3 also argues that it is difficult to distin- 
guish between the theories at a conceptual level. For example, suppose that a 
researcher finds that individual wages rise with tenure in a firm. This finding 
is consistent with agency theory, learning theory, or human capital theory. To 
put this in more familiar terms, much of the empirical work clearly spells out 
its null hypothesis but leaves unspecified a plausible alternative hypothesis 
against which the theory is being compared. I call this issue theoretical identi- 
$cation, Many of the papers provide evidence that is compatible with a particu- 
lar theory, but also with some other plausible alternatives. As a result, theoreti- 
cal work that intends to inform empirical work is insufficiently oriented toward 
distinguishing between plausible alternatives. 
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The second central theme of  section 9.3 is to point out data needs in this 
field. There is a current sentiment that enormous advances in this field can be 
made by  studying the personnel files of  large companies. By  doing so, re- 
searchers can develop a better understanding of work lives than is possible 
with aggregate data, which are often collected on workers across many firms. 
I share the enthusiasm for such data sets but believe that they will be capable 
of answering only a limited set of questions. I think that the greatest need in 
this field is to collect data on contracts themselves. Put simply, it is extremely 
difficult to make progress in understanding the effects of the employment con- 
tract if  the contract itself cannot be observed. Some recent research in under- 
standing the effect of incentives on performance, such as Knoeber and Thur- 
man  (1994), Chevalier and Ellison  (1995), Lazear (1996), and Fernie and 
Metcalf (1996) has taken such a perspective with impressive results, and I con- 
clude by  arguing that more progress can be made in this manner. 
9.2  Evidence on the Major Theories 
Researchers use three major theories to analyze compensation within firms: 
human capital theory, incentive theory, and learning or matching theory. The 
purpose of  this section is to identify the evidence on the relevance of these 
theories in the data. 
9.2.1  Human Capital 
Human capital theory argues that the primary source of variation in individ- 
ual wages is the value of the individual’s skills. Typically workers begin their 
careers at low  wages, perhaps as they are paying for the cost of  on-the-job 
training that they receive; ultimately they earn higher wages through the use 
of  these skills. With some further restrictions on the model, human capital 
theory predicts a wage that is concave in experience or tenure, as observed in 
the typical earnings equation. 
The basic earnings equation yields reasonable estimates of a return of  7 
percent for a year of education and a return to labor market experience of up 
to 7 percent, though there is some dispute about the return to tenure within 
a firm (Tope1 1991; Abraham and Farber 1987; Altonji and Shakotko 1987). 
Education and experience generate the most important differences in wages 
across workers, but other factors also affect how wages are determined and 
how  they change throughout a worker’s career. The papers reviewed below 
should be seen as evidence that factors beyond contemporaneous human capi- 
tal affect wages.3 
3. The tenor of the paper is that many factors other than human capital generate wages within 
firms. However, as an early antidote it is worth bearing in mind the findings of Brown (1989). who 
argues for the predominance of human capital theory in explaining wage dynamics. He argues that 
wage increases can be predicted only by human capital acquisition. Using data from the Panel 
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9.2.2  Incentives 
Incentives are generally argued to be the cornerstone  of economics, yet there 
is  surprisingly little clear-cut evidence that  changing incentive provisions 
within firms affects worker behavior. The available literature has taken two 
conceptual approaches to identifying the importance of incentive concerns. 
First, a relatively small number of papers have addressed the direct question 
Do incentives matter? in cases where data on contracts and productivity mea- 
sures are available. Second, most of the empirical work has tested for the im- 
portance of incentives by comparing the contracts that are observed with those 
that “should” arise if the theory is correct. Thus, if agency theory suggests that 
contract X should operate in some circumstances, then the existence of  con- 
tract X implies that incentives must be relevant. 
Do Incentives Matter? 
The first approach taken in the literature is to directly relate productivity 
measures to contracts offered. Few papers have addressed this issue for em- 
ployees within firms. This is largely due to data limitations. In order to carry 
out such an exercise, the researcher needs to collect data on both performance 
measures and the contracts offered to workers. Furthermore, the researcher 
must worry about the danger of  selection in contracts offered. For example, if 
one worker is offered a piece rate and another is offered a salary, one must ask 
why  this is the case. Could it be that better workers are observed receiving 
piece rates while their less able counterparts are paid salaries? If so, any esti- 
mate of  productivity differences will overstate the true effect of  piece rates. 
Despite these obstacles, a number of recent papers have successfully addressed 
these problems? 
Lazear (1996) uses data from a windshield fitting company to estimate the 
change in performance that occurred when the firm  introduced piece rates. A 
change in management resulted in the introduction of piece rates, initially in 
selected areas but eventually to all employees. He finds that productivity rose 
on the order of  35  percent from the introduction of piece rates. However, he 
shows that almost half the increase occurred from a selection effect, where the 
most able workers were attracted to piece rates and the less able left, again as 
predicted by the theory. Paarsch and Shearer (1996) use data on tree planters 
in British Columbia, where in some instances piece rates are used but in others 
replacement to be as competent as the respondent on his current  job, Brown finds that individuals’ 
wage increases can be closely approximated by the length of training time necessary on the job. 
After this reported training period, rewards do not increase. Brown’s interpretation  of this phenom- 
enon is that without human capital acquisition, there is little room for wage growth. 
4. It should be remembered that workers operate under implicit contracts, possibly in addition 
to explicit contracts. In the most prevalent form of implicit contract, poor performance will result 
in the worker’s being fired. Such implicit contracts,  which are never observed, surely affect worker 
behavior. As a result, we  should be aware that the studies in this  section (and throughout the 
paper) can only estimate the marginal effect of the explicit contracts given an unobserved set of 
implicit contracts. 333  What Happens within Firms? 
there are fixed wages. Using a more structural approach than Lazear, they find 
incentive effects that account for between 6 and 35 percent increases in pro- 
ductivity due to the compensation scheme. Once again, they find evidence of 
the selection effects of piece rates, providing another warning about simply 
comparing the productivity of  those on piece rates with those who are not. 
Fernie and Metcalf (1996) use data on the performance of British jockeys to 
illustrate that the use of bonuses attached to victories results in improved per- 
formance.s One of the most interesting discoveries of these recent papers has 
been the very large returns to pay-for-performance. 
In most firms, it is almost impossible to obtain a comprehensive objective 
measure of  a worker’s  performance. Kahn  and Sherer (1990) proxy worker 
performance by  performance evaluations provided by  a superior. They find 
that managers with higher incentive provisions have higher subsequent perfor- 
mance levels than other managers.6 Causality may be a concern here as there 
is a large literature illustrating that pay-for-performance can often cause high 
ratings, as supervisors realize that the cost of poor evaluations to workers is 
large.’ 
The performance of  entire nations is sometimes attributed to the provision 
of  incentives. Some recent work has addressed the effect of compensation in 
Japan and in Russia to understand the role of pay-for-performance contracts in 
explaining productivity. First, Jones and Kato (1995) use panel data on Japa- 
nese firms to estimate that the introduction of  employee stock option plans 
(ESOPs) increases worker productivity by approximately 5 percent, though the 
full effects are felt only after about four years. It should be remembered here 
that this does not really provide much of  a vindication of  standard agency 
theory because in a large firm ESOPs should have little effect as the marginal 
effect of effort on wages is negligible. Second, Barberis, Boycko, and Shleifer 
(1996) have addressed the effect of equity ownership for managers on the per- 
formance of  privatized shops in Russia. Their results suggest that this form 
of  incentive provision has had little effect, though selection issues remain a 
concern here. 
Another line of  research has considered the effect of  nonlinearities in re- 
wards. For example, suppose that a worker is rewarded with a salary unless he 
sells more than $100 worth of output in a year, in which case he gets a bonus. 
Agency considerations suggest that the behavior of the worker changes as he 
gets close to selling $100. For example, we would expect the worker to have 
different incentives if he has sold $90 by  1 December than if he has sold $9. A 
5. Marschke (1996) studies the effect of incentive provision in the context of a federal bureau- 
cracy, where  states offer incentives to the providers of  publicly funded job training for welfare 
recipients. He shows that  the  providers of training offer more appropriate skills when they are 
rewarded based on employment rates for the trainees. 
6. The identification strategy used here is that  some plant  locations offer different incentive 
packages than others. 
7. Abowd (1990) uses the event study methodology (where changes in stock prices reflect the 
importance of ‘hews”)  to illustrate the effect of new compensation plans on firm value. See also 
Putterman ( 1990) for an application to data on Chinese communes. 334  Canice Prendergast 
number of papers have addressed the effect of these nonlinearities on behavior. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1995) consider their effect on the risk-taking behavior 
of mutual fund managers. They show that mutual fund managers face nonlin- 
ear incentives because the “top” mutual funds tend to attract a particularly 
large inflow of funds and managers are rewarded according to fund size. Those 
managers close to the top have an incentive to take (inefficient) risks to gain 
such inflow. Chevalier and Ellison find that those managers who are found on 
the convex component of the reward schedule increase the riskiness of their 
portfolios, as predicted by agency theory. 
Other attempts to identlfy the effects of nonlinearities in rewards have been 
made by estimating the impact of quotas on performance. Asch (1990) studies 
the behavior of  navy recruiters who are rewarded on the basis of  a quota of 
recruits at the end of the calendar year. As they approach the end-of-year dead- 
line, the average quality of  recruits falls, illustrating harmful incentives in- 
duced by the contract offered. Similar evidence is provided by Healy (1985) 
on the willingness of executives to hide earnings if they are rewarded on the 
basis of thresholds. In particular, many executives are rewarded on company 
earnings only if they lie within a certain range. Above some level, rewards are 
fixed, while there is also a lower bound to rewards if eamings are particularly 
poor. This gives rise to an incentive for executives to hide earnings until the 
following year if  they are not within the range that generates returns. (This 
behavior is known among sales force workers as sandbagging.) Healy’s empiri- 
cal evidence supports this hypothesis. Finally, Oyer (1997) finds similar behav- 
ior by sales force workers and argues that business seasonality is likely to be 
partly generated by such incentives.* 
Two remaining areas of  incentive theory that have  attracted attention are 
tournament theory and the behavior of teams. Following Lazear and Rosen 
(198  l), many authors have considered competition between workers through 
the lens of tournaments, where agents compete for a fixed set of prizes, such 
as promotion. Tournament theory carries the following two testable implica- 
tions: (i) larger marginal prizes should increase performance, and (ii) those 
who are behind (ahead) should take more (fewer) risks. Empirical evidence 
(largely from sports contests) shows that as the spread in prizes between ranks 
increases, performance improves. Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) find that 
golfers’ performances appear to vary positively with the marginal return to 
effort, proxied by how prize money is allocated among finishers of different 
ranks. Becker and Huselid (1992) find similar behavior among professional 
auto drivers, but they also endorse another prediction of tournament theory, 
namely, that large prizes can give rise to dysfunctional behavior, as a greater 
return to a high placement results in more risky driving. Similar results have 
been found for the behavior of  farmers raising chickens (who are rewarded 
relative  to  their peers  by  the  broiler companies) in  Knoeber  (1989) and 
8. For related work on the behavior of the providers of publicly funded job training schemes, 
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Knoeber and Thurman (1994). Knoeber and Thurman also provide evidence 
on risk taking by  the less able in these chicken-breeding tournaments: 
A particular area of incentive provision that remains largely untested is the 
behavior of individuals within teams. Some economists warn against the incen- 
tive effects of teams, as free riding is likely to harm performance. Others claim 
that peer  pressure is likely to mitigate these problems.  Gaynor and  Pauly 
(1990) study productivity in medical practices of different sizes to illustrate 
the importance of free riding. The doctors were asked about their willingness 
to accept risky income, which was used as an instrument to predict the size of 
the practice.'" Gaynor and Pauly illustrate how performance falls as medical 
practice groups get larger, endorsing the free rider problem. Newhouse (1973) 
also addresses the effect of  group-based incentives in medical practices and 
shows that (i) overhead costs are higher in practices that share their costs and 
(ii) those doctors who share profits work less. Bailey (1970) finds similar re- 
sults with data on medical practices, while Leibowitz and Tollison (1980) find 
evidence that cost control is poorer in large legal practices than in small prac- 
tices. Each of these papers endorses the preeminence of free riding over any 
peer effects. On the other hand, Weiss (1987) is to my  knowledge the only 
illustration of the effect of peer pressure in teams. He uses data from a manu- 
facturing company to show that the introduction of team-based compensation 
increases the performance of the least able but decreases the performance of 
the most able, relative to outcomes that arise when workers are rewarded based 
on individual performance. A reasonable interpretation of  this is that under 
team-based rewards, workers learn to conform to a common norm. Addition- 
ally, he shows that the piece rate system increases turnover among the least 
able and the most able but not among average workers. A reasonable interpreta- 
tion of this is that the talented feel underrewarded and the least able feel excess 
pressure from the norms. In summary, then, the effect of incentives in teams 
seems to be largely dominated by  free rider effects, so that any benefits to 
teams must be largely technological rather than based on incentives. 
The Existence of Contracts 
The data requirements for testing whether incentives matter are stringent, 
As a result, a second approach to testing agency theory has been to consider 
whether observed contracts accord with available theory. 
Pay-for-performance contracts. The early literature on agency contracting has 
emphasized the trade-off of risk and incentives. From that perspective, incen- 
9. Using Australian data, Drago and Garvey (1998) verify the hypothesis that greater returns to 
promotion will result in less cooperative behavior by workers. This accords with theoretical work 
by Lazear (1989) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1992). Finally, Main, O'Reilly, and Wade (1993) 
endorse an  implication of tournament theory by  showing that  the reward for becoming CEO is 
greater if there are more possible candidates for the job at the next level down. 
10. Those who are less risk averse will work in smaller practices, as they are  more willing to 
give up divestification to avoid free rider problems. 336  Canice Prendergast 
tive provision is muted by the desire to provide agents with a relatively smooth 
income stream. We  would expect pay-for-performance to be lower in cases 
where either the environment is more risky or the agent is more risk averse. By 
contrast, those instances where the return to effort is large will imply higher 
pay-for-performance. The more recent literature (Holmstrom and Milgrom 
1992) has also emphasized the possibility that agents are likely to substitute 
between activities if offered piece rates. The typical example of this trade-off, 
referred to as multitasking, is where an employee ignores quality considera- 
tions to maximize the quantity of output he produces under a piece rate. 
Two  approaches have been taken in the literature on estimating pay-for- 
performance, which for the most part has either been on executives or sales 
force workers. First, Murphy (1986), Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Kaplan 
(1  994) have estimated the return to executives from improving various mea- 
sures of performance, such as earnings, the stock price, and so on. On the basis 
of these estimates, the authors have drawn conclusions about the effectiveness 
of  corporate governance. These papers have one potentially important draw- 
back; it is extremely difficult to identify the “right” level of incentives pre- 
dicted by  the theory since many  of the relevant variables (such as the cost 
of effort) are unobservable. Consequently, a second way of understanding the 
relevance of the theory is to consider whether pay-for-performance varies with 
the parameters identified above. Garen (1994), Shaefer (1994), Coughlin and 
Narasimhan (1992), John  and Weitz (1989), and  Kawasaki and  McMillan 
(1987) provide evidence suggesting that contracts operate in the predicted way, 
though the results are rarely resounding. 
Agency theory also predicts that when workers face common shocks to pro- 
ductivity, it is efficient to compare them to one another when deciding on re- 
wards. In this setting, workers are rewarded when those similar do badly and 
punished when similar workers do well. This serves to filter out common risk. 
Using data on executives, Antle and Smith (1986) find little evidence of such 
relative performance evaluation. By contrast, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) find 
that firms tend to compare their senior managers’ performance to stock market 
performance when determining  rewards. Somewhat surprisingly, they are more 
likely to use the stock market as the relevant comparison than the performance 
of competitors. 
It should be obvious that in some instances it is not necessary to provide 
workers with explicit incentives when they can develop reputations, if those 
reputations affect their wages. For instance, baseball players would continue 
to exert effort without rewards explicitly tied to measures of performance be- 
cause there is a market for players. An important consideration for many firms 
is to optimally combine these implicit contracts with more explicit contracts, 
such as stock ownership. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) address this problem by 
considering how managerial tenure affects the combinations of implicit and 
explicit contracts. In particular, does agency contracting for executives seem 
to reflect such reputational concerns? On the one hand, such reputational con- 337  What Happens within Firms? 
cerns are likely to be more effective when executives are new to the job, both 
because little is known about them and because they potentially have a long 
time in the job to gamer the fruits of a reputation. On the other hand, as they 
come close to retirement, they have less concern for reputation." 
An implication of agency theory is that managers close to retirement should 
be offered contracts with steeper incentive provisions, where rewards are di- 
rectly tied to performance, as reputational concerns are not sufficient to pro- 
vide incentives. Gibbons and Murphy find support for this proposition in their 
data, and more recent work by Gompers and Lerner (1 994) on venture capital- 
ists finds similar evidence. 
Some recent theoretical contributions to the compensation literature stress 
that incentives are likely to be constrained by the fact that they will result in 
inefficient rent-seeking behavior: workers will waste valuable time and re- 
sources attempting to persuade their superiors of their talents rather than pro- 
ducing (Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Prendergast and Tope1 1996).  An implica- 
tion of  this literature is that firms may  use institutional rules that constrain 
supervisors from rewarding those employees who are most able. Many authors 
have examined such bureaucracy in the employment relation, where many de- 
cisions are made by  rule rather than by discretion. For example, Freeman and 
Medoff (1984) highlight the importance of  seniority restrictions not only in 
layoff decisions but also in determining promotion. Similar data on bureau- 
cratic restrictions in firms are provided by  Spilerman (1986), who examines 
how firms doing similar things (e.g., policemen in Chicago vs. policemen in 
Philadelphia) often bureaucratically specify very different wage scales while 
leaving supervisors almost no room to maneuver.'* 
Agency theory focuses extensively on the effects of monitoring on the provi- 
sion of contracts. Firms spend considerable time and resources identifying how 
best to monitor workers, but at an empirical level economists have done little 
to understand  the costs and benefits of  various forms of  evaluation. Some 
workers are monitored on the basis of counted output, while others' perfor- 
mance is measured in a subjective fashion by a boss. This typically gives rise 
to certain problems, such as reluctance to offer bad evaluations (Larkey and 
Caulkins 1992) or accusations of favoritism (Bretz and Milkovitch 1989). Cer- 
tain types of workers are monitored frequently, while others are monitored at 
most annually. Many individuals are monitored on their inputs, while in other 
occupations workers can come and go as they please. With the exception of 
11. This arises because current performance is less informative about ability later  in a career 
than when the worker begins and because workers have little time left in which to get the returns 
to a good reputation. Consequently, poor performance later in the career will be less costly to the 
worker than earlier. Chevalier and Ellison (1996) show that  among mutual fund  managers, the 
marginal effect of poor performance on the propensity for the manager to be fired is greater for 
older managers, as predicted by the theory. 
12. The existing research on such bureaucratic constraints is mostly based on blue-collar wcrk, 
often in unionized settings. It  would be useful to how  more about their prevalence. E.g., are such 
seniority restrictions less common the farther one ascends in the hierarchy? 338  Canice Prendergast 
Brown (1990) and Bishop (1987), there has been little descriptive work that 
could identify how evaluations occur. Work needs to be done here in devising 
a simple taxonomy of  monitoring arrangements because this would provide 
useful information on how incentives are provided to workers who do not oper- 
ate under explicit incentives. 
Deferred compensation. A question that has received considerable attention 
from empirical researchers has been whether firms overpay older workers and 
underpay younger workers, which has been suggested as an optimal way  of 
providing incentives (Lazear 1981) and reducing turnover. These tests suffer 
from one major difficulty: observing productivity. Indeed, there is little need 
for seniority wages in situations where productivity is easily observed; it is a 
more potent instrument where output is difficult to measure or becomes ob- 
served only after some time. The only cases where this policy will be used is 
where output cannot be observed, making tests difficult. Despite this, a number 
of ingenious ways of identifying productivity have been considered. 
First, Medoff and Abraham (1981) use performance evaluations as a proxy 
for worker performance. In particular, they note that the wages of older work- 
ers are higher than their younger counterparts, despite equivalent performance 
ratings across age cohorts. To the extent that performance evaluations measure 
productivity (rather than, say, productivity relative to age-dependent expecta- 
tions) this constitutes evidence in favor of deferred compensation. 
Another way of estimating productivity would be to find a group of workers 
who do the same job as the workers in question but for whom there is no 
opportunity for backloading of wages. With this in mind, Lazear and Moore 
(1986) consider whether the wages of those in self-employment are as steeply 
sloped as those who work for organizations. Assuming that the jobs of the self- 
employed and employed are similar, any difference in slope between the two 
groups could be attributable to the desire of the firm to backload wages. The 
identifying assumption here is that the slope of the productivity profile is simi- 
lar for the two types of workers. Lazear and Moore find that the wage profiles 
of  the  self-employed are  less  steeply  sloped than  those  of  the  non-self- 
employed, which is consistent with deferred compensation being used. 
The idea behind backloading wages is that workers when they are young 
pay into a trust fund that is returned later in life. This logic holds only if the 
worker has been with the firm for some time. For a worker who joins a firm 
late in life, opportunities for backloading are severely limited. Using this idea, 
Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992) proxy productivity within firms by the wages of 
newcomers. For example, consider the wage of  a worker who is in her final 
year of employment and who joined a firm in that year. Her wage should be a 
reasonable measure of her productivity. If matching issues and specific human 
capital are not important, this wage should also be a good measure of the pro- 
ductivity of  a worker of that age who has been employed there for a longer 
time. Using this methodology, Kotlikoff and Gokhale compare the wages of 339  What Happens within Firms? 
newcomers and similar workers with more tenure and find that (i) the wages 
of office workers appear to be backloaded and (ii) those of salespeople are not. 
It should be remembered, however, that the identification restrictions (little 
specific human capital and little selection in late hires) are strong here.I3 
Alternative ways to identify the effect of seniority on pay come from directly 
considering rules in firms where wages or promotions increase with seniority 
independent of  any productivity issues. As  mentioned  above, Freeman  and 
Medoff (1  984) and Spilerman (1986) illustrate the prevalence of rules relating 
tenure and wages independent of productivity.I4 
The importance ofjobs. The standard labor problem cares little about the no- 
tion of a job, but it is clear that in many cases the primary route for advance- 
ment within a firm is through changing jobs, or at least through changing job 
titles. Should we care about this correlation? Is it not enough to know the re- 
duced form mapping given by earnings equations? There are a number of rea- 
sons for understanding the role of tasks and job assignments. First, researchers 
interested in discrimination often describe the mechanism by  which women 
and minorities are restricted in the labor market as a “glass ceiling,” where 
certain jobs are restricted to favored groups. But if  the sole route to career 
advancement is through changing jobs, there may be inefficiencies caused by 
certain jobs being “dead-end  jobs.” Similarly, if a particular individual has poor 
promotion prospects, he  is likely to have few incentives in a world where 
wages are largely attached to jobs (Gibbs 1995; Gibbs and Hendricks 1996). 
Finally, jobs play a central role in tournament theory, so an understanding of 
the role of job changes in career advancement may also cast light on how firms 
provide incentives. 
Many personnel files include data on wages and the history of jobs that an 
individual previously held within the firm, so that it is sometimes possible to 
identify the relationship between job changes and the evolution of wages. For 
example, using data from a single company Lazear (1991) finds that those 
workers who have experienced promotion in the past earn 21 percent higher 
13. Furthermore, an auxiliary implication of the deferred compensation model is that mandatory 
retirement is also likely to be used in conjunction with deferred compensation,  since overpaid 
older workers will be reluctant to leave. This has been addressed by Hutchens (1986). who shows 
that the existence of mandatory retirement can he predicted by the steepness of worker wage pro- 
files. 
14. As with many of the studies in this review, there is an alternative interpretation of the data. 
Some authors have argued that wages rise with seniority simply because workers like wages in- 
creasing the longer they stay on the job rather than because firms use this strategy to provide 
incentives. E.g.,  Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) use survey data that illustrate that individuals 
seem to prefer such wage profiles, even when net present value considerations suggest otherwise. 
Another related effort is Frank and Hutchens (1993), who consider two occupations (bus driver 
and airline pilot) where productivity “should be” relatively flat after initial training and where 
monitoring concerns are not deemed to be important. They show that the wages of airline pilots 
and bus drivers continue to increase long after agency and productivity growth issues would sug- 
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wages than those individuals who have  not. Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 
(1994b) find that the immediate premium on promotion in the firm they study 
is on average 6 percent but that this difference underestimates (by a factor of 
about four) the difference in average wages across levels, as subsequent pay 
increases are higher for those promoted than for those passed over.I5 Further- 
more, there is considerable overlap in wages across adjacent (in the hierarchi- 
cal sense) jobs, so that some workers in “lower” jobs are earning more than 
others in “higher” jobs. This observation is important as it suggests that firms 
use many means of providing incentives, not just the prospect of promotion, 
because there is considerable variation in wages within job grades. 
One of the most common bureaucratic rules within firms is that each job 
classification has a wage range that cannot be violated. For example, a job may 
have six grades; when a worker has reached grade six, there may be little the 
firm can do to increase the worker’s wage other than to promote her to a differ- 
ent job. This phenomenon, known as “topping out,” appears to be a concern of 
practitioners but has played little role in economic work on compensation. 
Some evidence on  this phenomenon is provided in Baker et al. (1994b), who 
show that such limits seem to constrain wage growth. Gibbs and Hendricks 
(1996) illustrate that firms do not seem to provide other incentives for those 
workers. Spilerman and Petersen (1993) show that firms can partly overcome 
this problem by transferring workers to jobs that do not entail such constraints. 
They also show that such transfers are an imperfect mechanism and that work- 
ers who are at the top of their wage grades are generally impeded from future 
increases. Somewhat surprisingly, they find no evidence that exits from the 
firm are accelerated by being at the top of a wage grade.16 
Doeringer and Piore (1  97 1) argue that one of the defining characteristics of 
an internal labor market is limited ports of entry, where the most senior jobs 
are filled by insiders. In other words, working one’s way through the system is 
an integral part of a career. However, the small amount of available data from 
personnel files on ports of entry (Lazear 1991; Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 
1994a) show little evidence of  this; instead there is considerable hiring from 
outside at all levels of  the firm. Further work on this issue seems necessary. 
For example, what are the characteristics of  those jobs filled internally? Are 
they predominantly low-skill  jobs? 
Eficiency wages. Efficiency wage theory argues that workers will be offered 
rents in order to increase productivity. Some work testing the validity of these 
theories has revolved around studying interindustry wage differentials using 
large data sets to measure whether workers are earning rents in  high-wage 
15. Groshen (1991) also addresses the importance of job classifications in wage determination. 
16. Lazear (1991) also points to the existence of considerable differences in promotion pros- 
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industries (Krueger and Summers 1988). An alternative test can be carried out 
using firm-level data, operating on the premise that firms will see supervision 
and wage premiums as substitutes for inducing effort. Since firms can induce 
effort either by  wages or by  monitoring, these instruments should be substi- 
tutes.  Data testing this hypothesis  have been  analyzed  by  Leonard (1987), 
Groshen and Krueger (1990), and Cappelli and Chauvin (1991) with mixed re- 
sults. ’’ 
9.2.3  Learning 
The talents of workers are rarely known for sure when they join a firm; they 
are gradually revealed as the worker spends time there. Recent theoretical work 
has argued for the importance of learning about worker talent as an explanation 
of wage dynamics in the labor market (e.g., Holmstrom 1982). The starkest 
form of learning, called pure learning by Farber and Gibbons (1996), assumes 
that the productivity of an individual is determined by a time-invariant charac- 
teristic, ability, where ability is gradually revealed over time. In this world, 
perceptions of ability evolve according to a random walk. 
Suppose that markets clear contemporaneously. Then the evolution of wages 
will map the arrival of  information about the worker’s talent. An immediate 
implication is that the variance of wages for a cohort of similar workers will 
increase over time as workers who were initially  similar are revealed to be 
dissimilar.’*  Furthermore, wages in this environment will follow a martingale, 
as the law of iterated expectations implies that future innovations to wages 
cannot be predicted by previous  innovation^.'^ 
This is a very stark form of learning as it allows no efficiency value to infor- 
mation on the worker’s ability and suggests that there are few returns to allocat- 
ing workers to suitable tasks or to allocating additional training to the most 
able. However, firms often devote considerable resources to identifying talent. 
This ability to assign workers on the basis of more precise information implies 
that wages no longer follow a martingale but instead follow a submartingale, 
17. It should not be surprising that this work has not provided a clear result, as it is not obvious 
at a theoretical level whether supervision and wages are complements or substitutes. Would we 
expect supervisors and rents to be complements or substitutes in the data? This seems to depend 
critically on the source of  variation across firms. On the one hand, if the source of variation across 
companies is the cost of supervisors, the two instruments probably will act as substitutes in the 
data where the high-cost-supervisor firms will use more wages and fewer supervisors to get effort 
exertion. On the other hand, if the variation across firms is primarily through the value of effort 
exertion, those firms that want more effort will probably use more of both instruments relative to 
those that do not value so much effort, so that supervision and wages will be complements in the 
data. Therefore, this does not seem as powerful a test as one might like. 
18. See, e.g., data in Spurr and Barber (1994) on the evolution of baseball salaries reflecting the 
revelation of information on talent. 
19. A further implication of this model is that the value of any attribute the worker holds when 
he joins the firm (such as race or education) will not change over time in an econometric regression 
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where the expectation of next year’s wage, given this year’s information, ex- 
ceeds this year’s wage. To phrase this in more familiar terms, information is 
useful because workers can be better sorted to jobs that match their talents. 
The role of learning in firms has often been analyzed by  considering the 
serial correlation of changes in rewards. There have been studies on serial cor- 
relation in rewards using both personnel files and larger data sets. Many studies 
using personnel files find evidence of serial correlation in promotions; those 
who are promoted quickly are more likely to be promoted again than the slow 
movers (Rosenbaum 1979; Bruderl, Diekmann, and Preisendorfer 1991; Spil- 
erman and Petersen  1993; Baker et al. 1994b; Spilerman and Ishida 1994). 
Baker et al. find similar evidence on wage changes (and residuals). However, 
the results from the more aggregate studies are mixed. For instance, Lillard 
and Weiss (1979) and Card and Hyslop (1995) find evidence of  such serial 
correlation by  observing a person-specific growth rate in wages. Farber and 
Gibbons (1996) also reject the assumption that wages can be modeled as a 
martingale, though not convincingly. On the other hand, Abowd and Card 
(1989), Topel (1991), and Topel and Ward (1992) find little evidence of corre- 
lation in wage changes. 
Some literature on human capital can also be used to cast light on this issue. 
Correlation in wage changes or promotion would be expected if the more able 
were trained more intensively throughout their careers. Barron, Black, and 
Loewenstein (1989) and Ashenfelter and LaLonde (1997) illustrate such a 
complementarity between observed ability and on-the-job training. For ex- 
ample, college graduates get more training than high school graduates, who in 
turn get more training than high school dropouts.  As a result, we would expect 
the wages of the more talented workers to increase at a more rapid rate than 
those of their less able counterparts. 
It is difficult to know how to interpret these results. The firm-level studies 
suggest that talent is identified and talented workers are treated differently than 
their less able counterparts, through either extra training or more difficult as- 
signments. At an intuitive level, this result is not surprising. More surprising is 
the lack of  support for the idea in the aggregate data, even when restricting 
attention to workers who do not change firms, as in Topel (1991) and Topel 
and Ward (1992). One possible reason for this, suggested by Gibbons (1996), 
is that such person-specific growth rates are evident only in particularly skilled 
occupations, but this has yet to be tested. 
One value of theoretical work should be to allow researchers to distinguish 
among various competing theories. A prime example of such an identification 
problem is the ability to distinguish  between human capital theory and learning 
as an explanation for wage dynamics. Consider the problem of  distinguishing 
between a model that views wages as evolving through learning about worker 
talents and another that identifies wage changes as being caused by  human 
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component to skills, where the value of  skills moves about each year subject 
to upward drift caused by  skill collection. What does the learning model pre- 
dict? First, the variance of wages will increase over time, and second, wages 
will follow a submartingale (if workers can be assigned to jobs based on dif- 
fering talents). Can this theory be distinguished from a model of human capital 
acquisition, where the value of a worker’s skills varies over time? A number of 
possible routes can be followed. First, Farber and Gibbons (1996) use a mea- 
sure of  talent that is available to the econometrician but not available to the 
firm to address whether wages are increasingly correlated with this measure 
over time. 
This is a prediction of the learning model since wages should increasingly 
track ability over time, and the ability measure is by assumption privately ob- 
served by  the econometrician. There are two necessary conditions for this to 
operate as a valid test of  learning over purely human capital: (i) the worker 
cannot credibly transmit this information to the firm, and (ii) the innovations 
to skills are not correlated with this measure of  ability (so that the human 
capital model has different predictions than the learning model). Using this 
methodology, Farber and Gibbons use aptitude test scores that suggest the im- 
portance of learning in the workplace. 
A final route that might be considered is to compare the relationship be- 
tween wage  innovations and tenure. A plausible restriction on the learning 
model is that the value of information is greatest at the beginning of a worker’s 
career and that ultimately new information is of  little value. It is not as clear 
why a human capital model with random shocks to productivity should have 
this feature, particularly for negative shocks.zo  As a result, it may be possible 
to identify the effects of learning in the workplace by considering the innova- 
tions of old workers relative to newcomers who are otherwise observationally 
equivalent. See Baker et al. (1994a) for details.21 
Learning and Insurance 
Learning involves the revelation of information that may reduce the wages 
of workers. However, risk-averse workers may demand that wages be insured 
against variation in the price of their services, say through an economic down- 
20. In most occupations, there is more opportunity to learn new skills when the worker is new 
to a job. However, there is little reason to expect that depreciation in skills should have this feature. 
2 1. A final career issue studied by sociologists is how quickly individuals become differentiated 
from their peers. Is it the case that within a given cohort of entrants, firms identify and reward 
their high performers soon after they arrive, or do they try to minimize differentiation within a 
cohort? Anecdotally it appears that firms are often reluctant to differentiate among workers, per- 
haps for fear of discouraging workers who are “left behind.” This aspect of career development 
has been addressed recently by Spilerman and Ishida (1994) using Japanese data. They show that 
for the first 10 years of a worker’s career there is little differentiation, with most workers moving 
up the corporate hierarchy at roughly the same rate (only the very low quality are not promoted). 
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turn. One strategy for understanding the importance of such insurance would 
be to compare real wage changes with changes in productivity, although such 
productivity may be hard to measure. 
A second approach, taken by Beaudry and Di Nardo (1991) and Baker et al. 
(1994b), has been to address the effect of  starting wages on current wages. 
Consider a world where workers are risk averse and write long-term contracts 
when they join a firm. The optimal risk-sharing contract smooths consumption 
across time periods. Therefore, economic conditions when the worker  joins the 
firm will predict future wages: those who join the firm when conditions are 
good will continue to get high wages in future years, even if conditions in 
those years are poor. Beaudry and Di Nardo show that a worker’s wage can be 
predicted by his entry-level (market) wage, even after controlling for the entry 
wages of newcomers. Even if the wages of entry-level workers fall, the wages 
of  existing workers will not change much. If  the newcomers are similar in 
quality to the older workers, fhis evidence suggests an insurance motive for a 
deviation from marginal product. 
Baker et al. (1994a) use firm-level data to illustrate the same phenomenon 
and can show in addition that despite differences  in wages across entry cohorts, 
there is no difference in their promotion performance so it does not appear that 
these differences reflect talent differences. Therefore, there appears to be a 
contractual mechanism between existing workers and employers that  does 
more than simply equate marginal revenue with the wage. 
Another form of insurance that workers may desire applies to their ability. 
When workers join a firm, there is typically uncertainty about their talents. In 
some instances, workers will be worse than initially anticipated. Workers may 
demand insurance against such permanent changes in their human capital. This 
demand for insurance must be balanced against the possibility of the worker’s 
leaving to get a better job. Harris and Holmstrom (1982) illustrate that the 
optimal solution to this problem is to offer workers a real wage that increases 
if the perception of the worker improves but cannot be reduced. A clever test 
of this model has been developed by Chiappori, SalaniB, and Valentin (1  996). 
They compare workers who started their careers similarly but whose paths 
diverged such that one employee had rapid wage increases followed by  flat 
wages while another had a slow beginning but eventually caught up to the first 
worker. An implication of Harris and Holmstrom is that the latter worker will 
fare better in future because his wage is increasing, implying that he must at 
least have been better than his last year’s impression. The most recent perfor- 
mance of the other worker was poor and so (in finance parlance) his option is 
likely to be “out of the money,” in that marginal increases in his performance 
will have no effect on future wages. Chiappori et al. find this pattern in the data. 
Learning and  Turnover 
Learning also plays a central role in the understanding of worker turnover, 
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of workers with particular employers.  Matching theory provides another reason 
for wages to increase with tenure-those  with long tenure will have  found 
better matches than those who have recently arrived in jobs. Available empiri- 
cal work has focused on the implications of tenure and demographic character- 
istics for job changing (see Farber 1994; Sicherman 1995; Mincer 1986). One 
way  of  identifying the effect of matching is to identify whether turnover pre- 
dominantly comes from those who appear to be faring poorly within firms, 
indicating that they are poorly matched. Little work has been done on turnover 
using personnel files, but available evidence suggests little evidence of system- 
atically more movement among the less able than among those whose perfor- 
mance is better than expected (Baker et al. 1994b). 
9.3  Identification and Data Issues 
9.3.1  Identification 
The ultimate objective of empirical work on incentives should be to find out 
why firms use the compensation policies they do and to determine the impact 
of such policies on productivity or welfare. This involves two important identi- 
fication problems. First, there is a need to develop empirical tests where pro- 
ductivity measures are related to compensation policies, where the source of 
the variation in such policies has been accounted for. This is the standard em- 
pirical identification problem. However, in many instances theories have  not 
yet been sufficiently developed to distinguish among different plausible theo- 
ries. The typical theoretical paper offers few empirical predictions: those that 
do so often offer suggestions about the data that are consistent with the theory, 
but unfortunately as yet we have few ways of distinguishing between theories, 
which I think is necessary to fully develop empirical testing of compensation 
policies. 
Empirical Identijication 
Selection problems pervade economic analysis, as individuals frequently 
choose the treatments they undergo. In studies of the employment relation, a 
two-sided selection problem clouds identification of  the effects of  contracts. 
First, employers choose the contract that will be offered to workers; quite pos- 
sibly different workers are offered different contracts. Second, workers are not 
bonded to their employers, so only certain workers may accept a given contract. 
Controlling for this problem is difficult, but without addressing it, there is little 
hope that the effects of contracts can be truly identified. 
Both empirical and theoretical work emphasize the importance of such se- 
lection effects. For instance, Lazear (1996) estimates that approximately half 
of the effect of piece rates on productivity can be attributed to more able work- 
ers’ being assigned to such contracts. Paarsch and Shearer (1  996) find similar 
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it is important to control appropriately for their effects in studying compensa- 
tions. Various ingenious strategies have been followed to control for such se- 
lection.**  Such identification assumptions play a particularly important role 
here because in many cases only imprecise information is available on other 
relevant data. For instance, in many studies either the contracts offered have to 
be  inferred (from, say,  the  relation  between performance evaluations and 
wages, as in Kahn and Sherer 1990) or the measures of the worker’s perfor- 
mance are imprecise (e.g., the  stock price as a measure of a CEO’s perfor- 
mance). There is little room for maneuver if the instruments are weak. In some 
cases the weakness of the basic data has made some of the identification re- 
strictions less reliable than we would like. 
Theoretical Identification 
Perhaps the primary objective of empirical research on organizations should 
be to understand why firms treat workers as they do. This requires that the 
available theoretical work be used to explain the data. Two approaches to mak- 
ing the theory data friendly can be followed. First, theoretical work can predict 
certain outcomes in the data, such as whether a particular outcome is compat- 
ible with the theory. For instance, to use the example earlier, incentive theory 
suggests that firms will sometimes backload wages. A failure to observe back- 
loaded wages would negate the relevance of  this theory. However, if  we see 
that wages are indeed backloaded, this does not necessarily imply that firms 
22. Among those used are the following: 
(1)  Variation in risk tolerance. Gaynor and Pauly (1990) use survey evidence on doctors that 
asks them about the importance of smoothness  in their income. This variable is then used to predict 
contracts offered and their impact on the performance of  medical practices. If  risk tolerance is 
uncorrelated with ability and the instrument has reasonable power in predicting contract choices, 
this would be a reasonable instrument. 
(2)  Variation across location. Kahn and Sherer (1990) use variation across positions and loca- 
tions in the firm in the sensitivity of pay-for-performance. Lazear (1996) uses the fact that con- 
tracts differ across plants as a means of identifying the effect of incentives. He uses worker fixed 
effects, so this identification strategy is reasonable as long as other (unobserved) management 
changes do not also differentially affect productivity in those locations. 
(3) Newcomers to the$m. In any situation where workers are compensated over the long term, 
we would expect to observe a difference in the way newcomers are paid relative to observationally 
equivalent workers with long tenure in the firm. This approach has been taken by  Kotlikoff and 
Gokhale (1992), Beaudry and Di Nardo (1991). and Baker et al. (1994a). One attraction of Baker 
et al. is that they illustrate that the quality of  workers is similar across the various cohorts, thus 
alleviating fears of selection effects caused by ability differences across cohorts. 
(4) Age or tenure. Age and tenure constitute a legitimate source of identification in a couple of 
settings. Models that rely on the importance of reputation typically depend on the worker’s hori- 
zon, which obviously depends on how long they will work before retirement. Gibbons and Murphy 
(1992)  use such theoretical constraints based on tenure to identify variation in the contracts offered 
to workers. As long as worker tenure is not correlated with other confounding effects, such as that 
the marginal return to effort is higher for older workers, this is a useful source of variation in the 
data that can be exploited. Tenure and age also play  an important role in  the identification of 
learning models, as plausible restrictions on learning models will imply that most learning about 
workers occurs early in the worker’s career. This feature has been exploited in Farber and Gibbons 
(1996), Glaeser (1992), and Baker et al. (1994a). 347  What Happens within Firms? 
do so for the reason posited; it could be for any other reason. A second ap- 
proach, which is much more difficult, is to offer suggestions about how the 
data could help to distinguish among a number of plausible theories. In other 
words, offer a plausible alternative hypothesis against which to compare theo- 
retical predictions. It is not the purpose of this paper to provide a menu of ways 
this could be done, but the following examples may be suggesti~e.~~ 
Are wages backloaded? Assume that a researcher finds evidence that firms 
overpay older workers but underpay younger workers and would like to inter- 
pret her results. One interpretation is that firms find this the optimal way  to 
provide incentives to workers. Another interpretation would be that they do so 
to offer a deterrent to quitting early, in which case firms will incur training or 
hiring costs. Finally, the data could simply reflect a preference among workers 
for wages that grow with age, say, as a way of forced saving. 
As yet, researchers have not tried to disentangle these competing hypothe- 
ses. However, a deeper look at the theories may  help us to make progress. 
Backloaded wages are likely to be a desirable means of  inducing incentives 
when output is hard to observe, where it may  take some time to determine 
performance. In cases where performance measures are easily available, there 
should be little need for such measures: instead, straight piece rates are likely 
to dominate. Next, consider the interpretation of  the data that firms wish to 
backload wages to induce workers not to quit. Such inducements are likely to 
be greatest when firms pay significant training or turnover costs. It may be pos- 
sible to disentangle these theories by considering whether the extent of back- 
loading varies by  occupation. Those occupations where output is hard to ob- 
serve (or where training is intensive) are more likely to offer backloaded wages 
than are other occupations if the incentive (or turnover) story is true, which is 
unlikely to be the case if workers simply prefer wages that rise with age.24 
The return to promotion. Wages rise as workers ascend a hierarchy. This is 
hardly surprising: more interesting is that the returns to promotion increase as 
one moves up the ranks of  an organization. Hence, the increase in wages on 
becoming CEO is larger than the increase on becoming a senior executive and 
so on. There are a number of possible reasons why firms may choose to skew 
23. An  alternative approach to designing theories that carefully distinguish among plausible 
alternatives is to provide multiple predictions from a given theory. The idea here is that the combi- 
nation of predictions is unlikely to replicate any other theory. See Gibbons and Waldman (1996) 
for such an approach. 
24. Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992) consider a firm including both office workers and sales force 
workers. Measurement of performance is easier with sales force workers, who are typically re- 
warded by piece rates. Kotlikoff and Gokhale find that backloading of wages occurs only for the 
office workers. This evidence suggests incentive concerns (or possible turnover issues if office 
workers have more training than sales force workers) rather than simply preferences for wages 
that increase with age, as there would be little reason for such preferences to be specific to office 
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wages in this way. One is that workers are sorted to jobs on the basis of their 
talents (Rosen 1982), where the most able affect the productivity of many oth- 
ers, and so their marginal product in those jobs is large. From this perspective, 
wage increases are simply a reflection of marginal product. However, tourna- 
ment theory suggests that firms may choose such skewed returns as a means 
of providing incentives (Rosen 1986).  A useful analogy is a tennis tournament. 
Consider the incentives of a player in the first round of a tournament. His return 
from winning the game is not only the prize money from being a first-round 
winner but also the option associated with the possibility of winning future 
rounds. This implies that there is a reason for the organizers of the tennis tour- 
nament to increase prizes in the later rounds, providing incentives not only in 
the later rounds but also in the earlier rounds through the increased value of 
the option. Similar logic holds within firms, where the return to becoming a 
senior manager may act as an inducement not just to middle managers but also 
to those lower in the organization who believe they ultimately have a chance 
of becoming a senior manager. 
Recent work on tournament theory, such as Eriksson (1996), has argued that 
increasing returns to promotion across ranks in a hierarchy constitutes evi- 
dence in favor of tournament theory. At one level, this is of course true, as a 
failure to find this would be a direct contradiction. However, it fails to distin- 
guish tournament theory from the plausible alternative described above. As a 
result, it may be necessary once again to delve somewhat deeper to better un- 
derstand the motivation of  firms. One plausible way to do this is to directly 
estimate the value of the option that underlies the tennis tournament analogy. 
In other words, how much should workers value the prospect of future promo- 
tions? This is not a conceptually difficult exercise to carry out as future promo- 
tion prospects and returns can be estimated. By estimating this option value, 
we can then determine whether the observed differences in wages across ranks 
correspond closely to the value of this option. If they do not, some other expla- 
nation would be more plausible. 
Learning and human capital. Wages typically rise as workers gain experience 
in the labor market. As described in the previous section, this could be caused 
by  workers’ collecting more skills or because information is learned about 
workers that improves matching. Distinguishing  between these two competing 
explanations has been the focus of recent work by Farber and Gibbons (1  996) 
and Baker et al. (1994b) and is an area where recent theory has been successful 
at providing a means of potentially distinguishing between the two theories. 
Two competing theories about wage dynamics are that (i) the value of a work- 
er’s skills varies over time and (ii) information is arriving on worker talents 
that allows better assignment of  the worker to jobs. Either of  these theories 
would predict wages that increase with tenure. However, the value of  informa- 
tion on a worker is likely to be greatest at the beginning of a worker’s career 
(or when he starts a new job); ultimately new information is of little value. It 349  What Happens within Firms? 
is not as clear why a human capital model with random shocks to productivity 
should have this feature, particularly for negative shocks. Baker et al. (1994a, 
199413) use this temporal dependence to argue for the importance of learning 
in explaining wage dynamics. 
9.3.2  Data Needs 
Tests of theories of compensation have been highly constrained by data limi- 
tations. To understand the effect of incentives on productivity, at the very least 
the researcher needs data on some reliable measure of output and the contracts 
under which workers operate. Given the difficulty in getting reliable measures 
of performance on workers, it is not surprising that much of the literature on 
agency contracting has been concerned with estimating the existence of con- 
tracts compatible with the theory, rather than their effects. It is also not surpris- 
ing that most work on agency contracting has been done on either sales force 
workers or CEOs, for whom contracts are most likely to be available. 
The greatest challenge to those studying the effect of compensation on per- 
formance is to understand how wages are determined for the typical worker 
who is not on a piece rate, whose output is subjectively determined by his boss, 
and for whom there are little data on the contractual environment. I would 
argue that this covers the majority of  workers in the economy, yet we know 
little about the contractual environment in which they work. It is in this context 
that there is considerable enthusiasm about recent work on personnel files of 
the type studied by Lazear (1991), Baker et al. (1994a, 1994b), and Gibbs and 
Hendricks (1996). I believe that a great deal can be learned about compensa- 
tion from such data archives. They may  be even more useful as a means of 
describing the work lives and careers of workers than for either identifying 
how workers respond to incentives or  understanding why firms carry out ob- 
served policies. Such personnel files typically contain voluminous information 
about jobs, wages, and benefits, and plenty of demographic data, but are bereft 
of information about contracts or performance. As a result, they may ultimately 
be more useful as a description of careers than anything else. While this is very 
valuable, a need for other types of data 
Huge advances in our understanding could be made by a concerted effort to 
collect data on contracts. By and large, data on contracts are scant, with the 
exception of some work on executives and sports players. However, my sense 
25. It would be useful to identify areas in which such data files can dominate the larger data 
sets commonly used by labor economists. What is it exactly about these data sets that distinguishes 
them from larger data sets with workers from many firms? To take one example, consider the issue 
of whether wage changes are serially correlated within firms. There is considerable work from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics data set on this issue, with mixed results. It is not yet clear how 
to evaluate the marginal product of  work from personnel files that tackle the same issue. They 
clearly constitute a more restricted environment than the larger data sets, but all the observations 
are from one firm.  What is the implication of this? Does the fact that the studies from personnel 
files suggest strong evidence of serial correlation mean that it is important to use other workers in 
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is that the marginal return to collecting such data would be large, and some of 
the most interesting papers on compensation (Knoeber and Thurman 1994; 
Chevalier and Ellison 1995; hear  1996; Paarsch and Shearer 1996; Fernie 
and Metcalf 1996) have given preeminence to collecting such data. Without 
data on contracts, it is close to impossible to identify how incentives affect 
behavior. Therefore, I believe that perhaps the largest holes in our knowledge 
about the provision of incentives arise from ignorance on how workers are re- 
warded. 
Only a limited number of workers are offered explicit contracts that relate 
wages to performance measures. The majority of workers operate in shadier 
territory where contracts are implicit, with the promise of a wage increase or 
promotion based on good performance.  As I mentioned above, one data limita- 
tion for understanding such workers is that there is little information on how 
workers are evaluated. Having such information may be a second-best way of 
understanding the contractual environment in which they operate. This is not 
an easy task, as illustrated by the dearth of papers that seriously consider per- 
formance evaluation (Brown 1990 is a notable exception). However, I would 
recommend that data be collected on such issues as (i) whether workers are 
promoted by merit or seniority, (ii) whether they are given discretionary bo- 
nuses, (iii) how often they are formally evaluated, and (iv) whether evaluations 
are based on objective or subjective  criteria. Such data would be very useful to 
researchers for understanding how incentives are provided within firms. 
9.4  Conclusion 
Empirical work on incentives and compensation  policies within firms is still 
at an early stage. In truth, there are few areas where much is known with cer- 
tainty, even at the level of the most basic question of all, Do incentives matter? 
The prime reason for this has been limitations on data. As a result, I feel that 
the most important advances in this field can be obtained by collecting more 
data on contracts and relating these to available measures of performance. 
This, of course, is easily said, but I believe that our understanding of the effect 
of  incentives has been advanced enormously in just the past two years by 
a series of papers that have taken this approach with much success. Each of 
these papers has illustrated large effects attributable to the use of pay-for- 
performance, which needs to be further studied. 
A second, and in my mind equally important, problem is that the available 
theoretical work has made too little progress in identifying the empirical impli- 
cations of theories relative to some plausible alternatives. A recent paper by 
Baker and Holmstrom (1995), “Internal Labor Markets: Too Many Theories, 
Too Few Facts,” summarizes  their view of the prevailing state of knowledge in 
this field. I think that it is indeed true that we have far too few facts, but I also 
believe that there is need to carry out theoretical work that could take a more 
empirical approach, ultimately allowing data to answer the question Can we 351  What Happens within Firms? 
distinguish between two supposedly plausible theories? If we do not answer 
these conceptual questions, progress in this field may be severely limited. 
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Comment  George A. Akerlof 
This interesting paper summarizes what we can learn from data on individual 
firms. It describes the ways in which compensation patterns might be used to 
test alternative theories of internal labor markets and the theoretical problems 
of interpretation of these tests. 
The interest in this subject comes from the different implications the various 
theories have for economic policy. At one pole are theories of the labor market 
based on perfect competition. Although compensation may not equal the mar- 
ginal product of each worker at each point in time, over the course of a worker’s 
tenure the expected value of her discounted marginal product should be equal 
to the expected value of her discounted compensation. If employees get more 
or less their marginal product in this fashion and there is an almost perfectly 
competitive labor market for workers, interventionist microeconomic and mac- 
roeconomic policy will be counterproductive. 
In contrast, if wages depend significantly on sociological considerations, if 
labor markets are noncompetitive, or if  there are important forms of  money 
illusion, interventionist policy can be effective in increasing welfare. If firms, 
for whatever reason, pay on average more than market-clearing wages, unem- 
ployment will develop. If, in addition, there is money illusion so that wages 
are sticky, monetary and fiscal policy will affect the level of  aggregate em- 
ployment. 
This paper pays special attention to three theories that can be tested from 
firm data. The first of these is the specific human capital theory; the second is 
information or learning theory; the third is implicit contract theory. The author 
gives an excellent survey of the findings of various researchers in firm person- 
nel records and the implications of those findings for the three theories. How- 
ever, since all of the theories are at least partially correct and they are hard to 
identify, the empirical findings are not very surprising. I would have liked to 
have seen more attention paid in the paper to the testing and implications of 
sociological or money illusionist theories-partly  because the testing of these 
theories has much more potential for surprise. Because only a handful of econ- 
omists will give even the intellectual time of day to such theories, rejection of 
the null hypothesis-that  a neoclassical model enriched by human capital the- 
ory, contract theory, and information theory explains all-will  have important 
implications. A discovery that  there is  something beyond  the  neoclassical 
model would be unexpected by  the economic orthodoxy. In addition, such a 
discovery should affect the construction of  macroeconomic models. An  out- 
standing example of  research of  this type is the examination of interindustry 
wage differentials by  Dickens and Katz (1986, 1987) and Krueger and Sum- 
mers (1987, 1988). The results in these papers on the nature of interindustry 
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wage differentials cannot be easily explained by efficient markets and efficient 
contracts and have been interpreted, although not without objections, as sup- 
port for efficiency wage theories. 
The theme of  this conference is the potential collection of  new data. The 
author has suggested that more data should be collected on the nature of labor 
contracts. That is a wonderful idea. The difficulties discussed in the paper in 
identifying the different theories occur because crude data is not sufficiently 
informative to allow acceptance or rejection of  any of the different theories. 
Like the author, I believe that much of the real data we need from firms will 
not come in the form of numbers but instead will be qualitative descriptions 
of  compensation and personnel practices. Such information can be obtained 
by  firm-level questionnaires. Alternatively, participant-observers can watch 
people closely at the workplace and interpret the meaning of their actions. 
A short time ago the Census Bureau contracted with anthropologists  to study 
reactions to the census, in order to determine where there would be important 
biases. I can imagine that firm-level sociological studies on wages, prices, ca- 
reer paths, entry and exit from firms, and forms of contracts could be very 
helpful in understanding how participants interpret personnel practices. Many 
years ago such questionnaire-based  and participant-observer studies were quite 
common. The names of Shultz, Myers, Bakke, Dunlop, and others stand out. 
With the identification problems discussed in this paper from examining only 
data on wages, such microstudies are likely to be the only way  to assess the 
relative importance of different theories of  internal labor markets. How else 
are we going to discover what managers think they are accomplishing with 
their wage and promotion structures? How else could we know about gift ex- 
change in the workplace if Blau and Homans had not observed workers closely 
and discovered the social meaning of their actions? A return to the research 
methods of yesteryear could have a very large return in our understanding of 
labor markets. 
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